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Thus Far and No Further: The New Mexico Supreme Court's Failure to Expand
the Rights of the Criminally Accused Beyond Search and Seizure Under the State
Constitution

Thus Far and No Further: The New Mexico Supreme Court's Failure to
Expand the Rights of the Criminally Accused Beyond Search and
Seizure Under the State Constitution

INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Supreme Court has at once been both proactive and
conservative in expanding the rights of the accused under the State Constitution. In the
field of search and seizure, the Court has been extremely active in heeding Justice
Brennan's call to the states to expand liberties under state constitutions.1 Article II,
Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, the search and seizure provision paralleling
the Fourth Amendment, has been given an interpretation significantly broader than its
federal counterpart. The New Mexico courts have gone out of their way to depart from
federal precedent in numerous areas including rejecting the Gates totality of the
circumstances test for finding probable cause in a warrant, the Leon good-faith exception,
the vehicle and border checkpoint exceptions, the public arrest standard, and the standard
for public school searches.
Through this jurisprudence the Court has articulated standards for when to depart
from federal precedent and how to raise and preserve an argument that the state
constitution provides more protection than the federal. At times, the court has gone to
great lengths to disagree with and criticize the U.S. Supreme Court for its parochial view
of the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and has expressed no qualms

1

See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev.

489 (1977).

l

in departing from federal precedent The court bas even used these greater protections to
exclude evidence sought to be introduced in state court that was seized by federal
agents-effectively eliminating any silver platter doctrine.
Interestingly, at the same time, the court has failed to expand other rights of the
accused with few exceptions.2 The inconsistency in the Court's dogged insistence on
expanding search and seizure rights and its persistent refusal to expand rights in other
areas of criminal procedure is striking. That the Court has only recently expanded rights
in the area of search and seizure, yet refused to in other areas, is equally baffling.
This paper seeks to explore some of the reasons why this dichotomy has occurred
and offers a few strategies to argue for expansion in three other areas. These include the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and the right to confrontation.
These subjects were chosen because they have, from time to time, been identified as
some of the more fundamental rights possessed by the accused. Perhaps not unrelated,
they also appear to have the largest effect on the guilt-innocence determination-the
ultimate determination to be made in a criminal case.
Part I will discuss the Court's expansion in the area of search and seizure.
Concomitant to the Court's expansion in this field, has been the development of the
procedure for arguing for expansion, including the proper method for raising and
preserving a state constitutional claim. Part II will overview the Court's current positions
on a few selected subcategories of each of the three categories mentioned above. Finally,

2

The Court has done some minimal expansion in the areas of double jeopardy, see State v. Breit, 122 N.M.
655, 930 P .2d 792, and jury trial rights for juveniles. See Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 724, 437 P.2d 7 I 6,
723 (1968).

2

Part III will explore possib le arguments and strategies for persuading the Court to expand
these rights and depart from its propensity to be in lock step with federal precedent.

I. NEW MEXICO'S INDEPENDENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE
JURISPRUDENCE
Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides :
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects,
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any
place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place
to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor without a written
showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affmnation .
It was not until 1 989, in State v. Cordova,3 that the New Mexico Supreme Court first
departed from federal precedent reading this provision more broadly than its federal
counterpart, the Fourth Amendment.

4

However, it would not be unti l almost four years

later when the Court handed down State v. Gutierrez,5 the case that was the catal yst for
departing from federal search and seizure j urisprudence. The procedure for departing
from federal precedent under the New Mexico Constitution and raising and preserving
the issue properly was only recently set out seven years ago, in State v. Gomez. 6

3
4

1 09 N.M. 2 1 1 , 784 P.2d 30 ( 1 989 ) .
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the peop le to be secure in their persons houses, p apers , and effects , a gainst
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported b y Oath or a ffirmation, and particularly describing the
p lace to be searched, and the pe rsons or things to be seized.

Although, New Mexico's provision differs slightl y from the federal provision, the Court has not
largel y relied on textual differences in exp anding search and seizure rights under the state
constitution.
5 l 1 6 N . M . 43 1 863 P.2d 1 052 ( 1 993 ) .
,
6

1 22 N.M. 777 , 932 P . 2d I ( 1 997).

3

Nevertheless, the Court has made numerous departures from federal precedent in the last
fifteen years.

A.

State v. Cordova and State v. Gutierrez: Fundamental Rights Approach
and the Beginning of the Court's Expansion of Search and Seizure
Rights.

In State v. Cordova/ the New Mexico Supreme Court departed from federal
search and seizure jurisprudence for the first time. 8 Under established Fourth
Amendment law, when an affidavit is used in an application for a search warrant, the
affidavit must contain su fficient facts to allow the reviewing magistrate to independently
determine if probable cause exists to issue the warrant. 9 All too often, those affidavits
rely on confidential police informants (CI) to demonstrate the existence of probable
cause. 1 0 To satisfy the probable cause requirement in an affidavit based wholly or in part
on hearsay provided by a CL the United States Supreme Court developed what came to
be known as the Aguilar-Spinelli test based on Aguilar v. Texas, 1 1 and Spinelli v. United

States. 1 2 In order for such an affidavit to be constitutional, the test requires the magistrate

7

1 09

.M . 2 1 1 , 784 P.2d 30 ( I 989).

8

See Stare v. Gutierrez, 1 1 6 N.M . 43 1 , 440, 863 P.2d 1 052, 1 06 1 ( 1 993) (stating that Cordova marked the
court's first departure from federal search and seizure case law).
9

Cordova, 1 09 N.M. at 2 1 3, 784 P.2d at 33. This of course preserves one of the fundamental requirements
of the Fourth Amendment that • no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation . . . .' U.S. Const. Arndt. 4.
1

° Cordova, 1 09 N.M. at 2 1 3, 784 P.2d at 33.

II
12

378 U.S. 1 08 ( 1 964).
393 U.S. 4 1 0 ( 1 969).

4

be provided with some of tbe underlying circumstances that demonstrate ( 1 ) the Cl' s
basis of knowledge, an d (2) how the officer determined the C I was credible or truthful. 1 3
The U . S. Supreme Court overruled the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Gates v. fllinois, 14
in favor of a totality of the circumstances test. Under the Gates analysis, the basis of
knowledge and veracity or credibility determinations are still important factors, but law
enforcement no longer is required to meet both prongs in order to satisfy the probab le
cause requirement. 1 5 The Court changed the standard based on its belief that lower courts
were applying the two-prong Agu ilar-Spinelli test too rigidly. 1 6 This, the Court believed,
was inconsi stent with the probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment, which is a
"fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal nJles.''

17

Prior to Gates, New Mexico followed Aguilar-Spinelli. After Gates, the New
Mexico Supreme Court used Cordova to determine whether Gates or Aguilar-Spinelli
would apply to affidavits based on CI hearsay information. 1 8 In making this
determination, the court found the primary reason for abandoning Aguilar-Spinelli i n

Gates-the overly rigid and technical application of the tw o prong test-had not proved

13

Cordova, 1 09 N.M. at 2 1 3, 784 P.2d at 33. These requirements are commonly referred to as ( 1 ) the basis
of knowledge test, and (2) the veracity or credibility test. Id.
14
15

16

462 U . S . 2 1 3 ( 1 983).

Cordova, 1 09 N.M. at 2 1 5, 784 P.2d at 34 .
Id.

17

Gates, 462 U.S. at 232; see also Cordova, 1 09 N.M. at 2 1 5, n. 6, 784 P.2d at 34 (explaining that based on
this rigidity, the Court believed the value of anonymous tips in would be diminished and officers may
resort to warrantless searches).
18 Cordova, 1 09 N.M. at 2 1 2, 784 P.2d at 3 2 .

5

to be true in New Mexico.

19

The court cited numerous cases evincing its and the court of

appeals ' practical, common sense oriented, and deferential approach to determining the
existence of probable cause under these circumstances.

2

° Further, the court noted :

We believe these principles to be firmly and deeply rooted in the
fundamental precepts of the constitutional requirement that no warrant
issue without a written showing of probable cause before a detached and
21
neutral magistrate.
Accordingly, the court concluded the Agu ilar-Spinelli test "better effectuat[ ed] the
principles behind Article TI, Section 1 0 . . . than does the 'totality of the circumstances ' test
set out in Gates.',22
While Cordova marked the first departure from federal precedent, State v.

Gutierrel3 was the springboard for the court's rampant departure from federal search and
seizure jurisprudence. Gutierrez rejected the U.S. Supreme Court's so-cal led good faith
4

or Leon exception.2 This exception, adopted in United States v. Leon

25

allows evidence

to be admitted at trial that was seized pursuant to an invalid warrant, so long as the
officers who seized the evidence relied on the warrant in good faith.

26

In short, although

19 Id. at 2 1 6, 3 5 .
20

Id. The court also noted that New Mexico's rules d o not encourage rigid application fo r instance, when
an affidavit contains information from a highly credible CI, but fails to show the Cl 's basis of knowledge.
Id. Instead, in close cases like this, the rules encourage the magistrate to extract further information either
from the officer or by calling the CI as to testify. Id.
i,

Id.

22 /d. at 2 1 7, 36. The court was careful to note this holding was pursuant to its role in interpreting the state
constitution. Id. It went on to hold the affidavit in that case to be insufficient for failure to adequately
demonstrate the Cl's basis of knowledge. Id.
23 1 1 6
24

25
26

.M . 43 1 , 863 P.2d 1 052 ( 1 993).

Id. at 447, 1 068.
468 U .S. 897 ( 1 984).
ld.

6

the warrant is lacking sufficient facts to establish probable cause, if "it was
understandable for a reasonably well-trained officer. . . to think that the warrant
application comported with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment," then the
evidence seized will not be suppressed.

27

The decision was premised on the Court ' s

understanding o f the nature of the exclusionary rule.

28

The Court stated that the

exclusionary rule was not a "necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment," but rather is
solely for the purpose of deterring misconduct among law enforcement. 29 Accordingly,
once an invalid warrant has issued and been executed by an officer acting in good faith,
the exclusionary rule serves no purpose. 30 Penalizing one who has acted in good faith
can have no deterrent effect on future misconduct.

31

To determine i f the good-faith exception should app ly under the state constitution,
the New Mexico court first examined its own jurisprudence with regard to the
exclusionary rule. 32 Interestingly, New Mexico refused to adopt the federal exclusionary
rule until it was applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v.

Ohio. 33 Subsequently, the court interpreted the state constitution in lock step with the

27
18

Gutie"ez, 1 1 6

.M. at 437, 863 P.2d at 1 058 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Id.

29 Id. at 437-3 8, l 058-59. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has previously relied on preserving judicial
integrity as well as deterrence as justifications for the exclusionary rule, it is clear that deterrence is now the
predominant focus.
30

Leon, 468 U. . at 920-2 1 .

3 1 id.
32

See Gutierrez, 1 1 6 N.M . at 438, 863 P.2d at 1 059.

33

367 U . S. 643 ( 1 96 1 ). Even a fter Mapp New Mexico "grudgingly" accepted the exclusionary rule.
.M. at 439, 863 P.2d at 1 060 (noting that New Mexico acknowledged Mapp, but in each
case found a reason why the evidence would not be suppressed).

Gutierrez, 1 1 6

7

federal interpretations of the U.S. Constitution until Cordova.

34

In discussing its opinion

in Cordova, the Gutierrez court emphasized that the decision to depart from federal
precedent was based on its belief that the Aguilar-Spinelli test reflected fundamental
principles and precepts of the state constitution's search and seizure requirements.

35

It

appeared, therefore, in light of Cordova, that although the court had not interpreted
Article II, Section 1 0 differently than the Fourth Amendment from 1 9 1 1 up until 1 989, it
was wi lling to give this provision an independent interpretation .
The court next attempted to ascertain the Framers ' intent with regard to Article II,
Section 1 0 to determine whether any exclusionary rule was intended. It went through a
tortured anal ysis, examining search and seizure law at the time the constitution was made
in 1 9 1 1 . 36 Unfortunately, the court could not come to any definitive conclusions about
what the Framers' intended with regard to exclusion of evidence, concluding the most
reasonable inference is that they left it to the courts to make this interpretation. 37
Against this background, the court, relying in part on interpretation of similar
provisions in sister states, held the exclusionary rule was included within the right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure.

38

The court was clear that the exclusionary

rule was not a j udicial remedy, but a necessary part of the right. 39 The Framers' did not

34

Gutierrez, 1 1 6 N.M. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1 06 1 .

3S Id.
36

31

See id. at 442-43, 1 063-64.
Id. at 443-44, 1 064-65 .

;s Id. at 445, I 066.
39

Id.

8

intend to create a mere ' code of ethics under an honor system. ,4o Thus the exclusionary
rule is necessary to ..effectuate in the pending case the constitutional ri ght of the accused
1

to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.',4 The court believed the exclusionary
rule was simply a form of j udicial revi ew over executive conduct.

42

It explained :

The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is in a sense a
passive right, unlike the active rights of free speech and free exercise of
religion. It is perhaps this nature of the right and the context i n which it
arises that make troublesome j udicial review of violations . . . . When a
court finds the government has unconstitutionally restricted a person ' s
speech, the court orders the restraint lifted and enj oins further restraint . . . .
Once a violation o f Article II, Section 1 0 has been established, we do no
more than return the parties to where they stood before the right was
43
violated.
Thus, j ust as li fting a restraint on speech is not a mere judicial remedy, neither is
excluding

evidence

requirements.

seized

in

violation

of constitutional

search

and

seizure

44

The good-faith exception cannot survive m a j udicial environment that gives
constitutional status to the excl usionary rule. It is incompatible with the notion that the
exclusionary rule effectuates the right in the pending case.

45

As the focus of the right is

properly on the individual, it matters not what motive the officer, or anyone else had
when that individual ' s rights were vio lated.

40

Once a vio lation has occurred, the only

Id.

� • Id. at 446, 1 067 (citing Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary
Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 25 1 , 324-26 ( 1 974) (suggesting that the
exclusionary rule is simply another name for judicial review of executive conduct)).
42

Id.

43

Id.

44 Id
.
45

Id. at 447, 1 068.

9

· proper thing to do, as a j udiciary bound to review the actions of the executive and
legislative branches, is exclude the evidence.

B.

State v. Gomez: The Process for Arguing for A Departure from
Federal Precedent

Gutierrez, expanding on the seed planted in Cordova, laid the theoretical and
legal foundation for departing from federal search and seizure precedent. If Gutierrez
46

can be seen as the foundation, State v. Gomez

is the structure built on that foundation.

It not on ly expanded Article II, Section 10 further beyond its federal counterpart, but it
laid out the procedural requirements for raising, preserving, and arguing any departure
from federal precedent based on state constitutional grounds.
In Gomez, the court considered whether Article II, Section 10 a1lowed for a so
called "vehicle exception" to warrantJess searches of automobi l es, as the U . S . Supreme
court had so interpreted for the Fourth Amendment.

47

Typically, under federal law, in

order to perform some type of search on officer needs probable cause and either a warrant
or an exigent circumstance permitting a warrantless search.

48

With respect to

automob.i les, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an officer may search any lawfully
stopped vehicle and closed containers within the vehicle if the o fficer has probable cause
that a seizab le item will be found.

46
47

1 997- MSC-006, 1 22

49

This bright-line exception is founded on two

.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 .

Gomez, 1 997-NMSC-006, ,J I , 1 22 N.M. at 779 , 932 P.2d at 3 .

48

An exigent circumstance has been defined as "an emergency situation req uiring swift action to prevent
imminent danger to life or serious dama ge to prope rty, or to forestall imminent escape of a suspect or
destruction of evidence. State v. Copeland, 1 05 .M . 27, 3 1 , 727 P.2d 1 342 , 1 346 (Ct. App . 1 986) .

See Califomia v. Acevedo 500 U.S. 565, 575-76 ( 1 99 1 ) ; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800
( 1 982 ) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 1 32 ( 1 925 ) (creating the automobile excep tion) ; see generally 3
Wa yne R. Lafave Search and Seizure § 7.2 ( a ) - ( b) ( 3d ed. 1 996).
49

suppositions: ( 1 ) the inherent mobility of automobi les creates exigent circumstances, and
(2) there is a lesser expectation of privacy in the contents of motor vehicles because of

.

. 50
pervasive regu I ahon.
In rej ecting a bri ght-line vehicle exception the court noted that since
has given independent meaning to Artic le II, S ection 1 0.

51

Cordova, it

It further noted that in this

independent interpretation, the court bas given strong preference for warrants. 52 In the
context of a vehicle search, warrants are preferable because they inj ect "a neutra]
magistrate into the process of searching a vehicle or containers within it . . . [which]
provides a layer of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. "

53

To overcome

this stringent warrant requirement and conduct a warrantless search of an automobi le, the
circumstances must be such that a reasonably well-trained officer would believe an
exigency exists.

54

The court refused to create a bright-line exception, preferring instead

that each case be decided based its own set of facts and circumstances. Indeed, the court
departed from federal precedent because it disagreed with the application of bright-line

50 Gomez, 1 997-NMSC-006,
5 1 Id. at

34.

35.

52

Id. at 36. There is great debate among scholars and jurists as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill of
Rights regarding the use of warrants. Some believe the Framers meant warrants to always be used absent
emergency circumstances, while others contend the warrant clause in the Fourth Amendment was designed
solely to eradicate the general warrant. See generally, Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 1 07 Harv. L. Rev. 757 ( 1 994); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment,
98 Mich. L. Rev. 547 ( 1 999); Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement,
1 9 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 603 ( 1 982).
53

Gomez, 1 997-NMSC-006, 1 3 8 . The magistrate acts as a buffer between the law enforcement officer and
the citizen subject to search and prevents the competitive aspects of crime fighting from compromising the
officer's jud gment. Id.
54

Id. at ,i 40.

I1

rules in light of the "fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry."55 The U.S.
Supreme Court' s automobile exception was thus at odds with the overarching principle
behind the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Gomez court's departure from the federal automobile exception marked an
important expansion of state constitutional rights. Equally, important was the second
issue of determining the necessary steps to raising and preserving a state constitutional
claim as well as adopting an analytical approach used to determine if departure from
federal precedent is warranted.
The court first dealt with the proper analytical approach to determine if departure
is warranted.

56

State constitutional interpretation can be classi fied into three approaches:

( 1 ) lock-step, (2) primacy, or (3) inters titial.

57

A state court using the lock-step approach

will simply follow federal precedent in interpreting its own constitution and refuse to
expand state constitutional rights beyond those of the federal. The primacy approach
holds that a state court will look first to its own constitution and precedent to determine if
the right asserted is protected. 58 If the right is protected, the court need not examine the
federal question.

59

Conversely, under the interstitial approach, the court looks first to

55

Id. at ,i 45, (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 5 1 9 U.S. 33 ( 1 996) (preferring totality of circ umstances approach
over any "litmus paper test" in recognition of the infinite variations in the facts and circumstances
surrounding a search and/or seizure)).
56

While research reveals that the court has not strictly followed this approach, as will be argued in this
paper, supra, using the court's approach makes for better argument for expansion in areas where the court
has yet to do so.
51

Gomez 1 997-NMSC-006, ,i 1 8; see generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State
Constitutions: The Emergence ofState Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 1 4 1 ( 1 985) {discussing
approaches).
ss

Gomez, 1 997-NMSC-006,

1 8.

s9 Id.

12

federal law. 60 If federal law protects the right being asserted, the state court wil l not look
to its own constitution.

61

On the other hand, if federal law does not protect the right, then

the court wi ll conduct an independent examination to assess whether its state constitution
should provide more protection.

62

Noting its recent abandonment of the lock-step

approach, the court adopted the intersti tial approach as the most effective way to maintain
national uniformity whi le still prov iding for independent state constitutional rights. 63
Accordingly, the interstitial approach informed the procedure for properly rai sing
a

and preserving a claim. If there is estblished case law that interprets a provision of the
state constitution more broad ly, the claim is preserved by asserting the state constitutional
principle sought to be applied and showing the factual basis needed for the trial j udge to
rule on the issue. 64 If a litigant is claiming a right that has not been interpreted more
broadly than its federal counterpart, then "a party also must assert in the trial court that
the state constitutional provision at issue should be interpreted more expansively than the
federal counterpart and provide reasons for interpreting the state provision di fferently
from the federal provision."65 The court refused to require the party cite speci fied criteria
for departing from federal precedent. 66 S igni ficantl y, however, the court cited three
reasons for departing from federal precedent under the interstitial approach : ( 1 ) a flawed
60

61

62

id. at 1 9 .
id.

id.

63 id. at ,i 2 1 .
64 id. at ,i 2 2 .
65
66

Id. a t ,i 2 3 .
Id. a t 23 , n. 3 (noting that other states d o have such a requirement).

13

federal analysis, (2) structural differences between state and federal government. or (3)
distinctive state characteristics.

C.

67

Cardenas-Alvarez: Applying State Constitutional Law to Actions of
Federal Law Enforcement Agents.

In a prime examp le of its willingness to expand the search and seizure protections
afforded under the state constitution? the court held that evidence sought to be introduced
in state court that was seized by federal agents legally under the Fourth Amendment. but
illegally under Article II. Section 1 0, will be suppressed. 68 This holding was premised on
the Gutie"ez opinion 's declaration that Article II. Section 1 0 •is an expression of the
fundamental notion that every person in this state is entitled to be free from unwarranted
government intrusion:

.69

Therefore, federal agents who exercise jurisdiction over New

Mexico inhabitants should not be free to violate those inhabitants state constitutional
rights.

70

While the court found that it could not control the actions of fed eral agents or

constrain them in any way, it does possess the authority and has the duty to prevent

61 Id.

at 1 9. As discussed, supra, the court departed from the federal vehicle exception viewing it as
inconsistent with the case-by-case reasonableness approach generally used in search and seizure analysis.
Thus, Gomez provides a good example of a departure based on a flawed federal analysis. See also
C-Ordova, 1 09 N.M. at 2 1 6, 784 P.2d at 3 5 (departing for distinctive state characteristics); Gutierrez, l 1 6
N.M. at 445, 863 P.2d at 1 066 (same); State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 200 1 -NMSC-0 1 7, 5 1 , 1 30 .M. 3 86,
407, 25 P.3d 225, 246 (Baca, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that when specific textual differences
exist between the state and federal constitutio� departure is warranted for 'structural differences between
the state and federal government").
68

Cardenas- Alvarez, 200 1 -NM C-0 1 7, ,i 1 8 .

69

Id. (emphasis added). Th e court also relied o n the purpose behind the exclusionary rule-to "effectuate
in the pending case the constitutional right of the accused to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id.
10

Id.

14

evidence that is seized in violation of the state constitution from being used in state
court.

71

Cardenas-Alvarez marked yet another departure from federal precedent regarding
searches and seizures of automobiles. The court held the New Mexico constitution
required that after Border Patrol agent at a fixed border checkpoint has asked about a
motorist's citizenship and has reviewed the motorist ' s documents, any further detention
requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 72 Under the federal analog, a lesser
standard was used. 73 To pro long a stop beyond the routine ci tizenship and vehicle
documents inquiry an agent must believe "suspicious circumstances" exist.

74

II. NEW MEXICO'S LOCK-STEP CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE
In marked contrast to the New Mex ico court ' s wi l lingness to independently
interpret Article II, Section 1 0, other fundamental rights of the accused have been
interpreted in lock step with federal precedent. Although this paper wi ll on ly cover a few
subcategories of the privi lege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel and the
right to confrontation, other important areas of criminal procedure have also been
interpreted in lock step with their federal analogs. This section will briefly cover the
court 's current positions on the selected subcategories. There is very li ttle in the way of
reasoning as to why the court has refused to depart, as the issue is either not addressed or
the court simply acknowl edges its refusal to depart without stating i ts reasons.

71

Id. at 1/ 19.

12

Id. at 20.

73

See State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2000-NMCA-009, ,i 1 2, 1 28

74

Id.

15

.M. 5 70, 574, 995 P.2d 492, 496.

A.

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination : Involuntary Statements and
Miranda Rights.

Article II, Section 1 5 of the New Mexico Constitution provides: "No person shall
be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding . . . . " Similarly, the Fi fth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads : ''No person . . . shall be compelJed in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . .. • In Miranda v. Arizona, 75 the U . S .
Supreme Court held that in order to effectuate thi s right and prevent police coerciveness
which may lead to a confession given involuntarily, the police must inform an accused
who is in custody, prior to questioning, of his or her right to remain silent, the right to
have an attorney present during questioning, and that an attorney wi l l be provided by the
state if the accused cannot afford one.
In implementing Miranda, many questions arise as to when an accused is in
custody, when the right has been asserted when the right has been waived, and when the
right has been violated. This author found no case where the New Mexico courts
departed from federal precedent in these areas. Indeed, the courts have been in lock step
with federal precedent. 76
Not unrelated to the protections provided by Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court
has also held that involuntary or coerced statements cannot be introduced at trial as they
vio late the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause as wel l as due process. 77 The
Court, however, will not reverse a conviction where such a statement was introduced
?S
76

384 U.S. 436 ( 1 966) .
See e.g. State v. Gutierrez, 1 1 9 N.M. 6 1 8 , 894 P.2d 395 ( Ct. App. 1 995 ) (holding that Fifth Amendment

and Article n Section 1 5 both re q uire a defendant to claim the p rivilege in order for him to be "compelled"
within the meaning of those provisions ) .
11

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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against a defendant if the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
erroneous admission of the confession did not affect the trial outcome. 78 This harmless
error analysis is the subject of much criticism and skepticism as to its accuracy.

79

Once

again, the New Mexico courts have foJlowed this harmless error rule in lock step with the
U. S. Supreme Court. 80

B.

The Right to Counsel : Effective Assistance.

The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Its state
counterpart, Article IT, Section 1 4 provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to . . . defend himself. . . by counsel." The U.S. Supreme Court bas
held that the right to assistance of counsel means an accused must have effective
assistance of counsel. 8 1 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under
both the state and federal constitutions an accused must show his or her ''counsel 's
performance fell below the standard of a reasonably competent attorney and, due to the
deficient performance, the defense was prejudiced."82 Prejudice i s shown if there is a
reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the j ury would have had a reasonab le doubt

78

Arizona v. Fulminante 499 U.S. 279 ( 1 99 1 ).

79

See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm ofApplying Hannless Error to Coerced
Confessions, 1 05 Harv. L. Rev. 1 52 { 1 99 1 ); SauJ M . Kassin & Hol ly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the
Jury: An Experimemal Test of the "Harmless Error " Rule 2 1 Law & Hum. Bebav. 27 ( 1 997) (finding in

studies of mock j urors that a confession increases the conviction rate, even when jurors treated it as coerced
and claimed it had no effect on their verdict).

80

State v. Gallegos, l 04 N.M. 247, 254, 7 1 9 P.2d 1268, 1 275 (Ct App. 1 986); see also State v. AlvarezLopez, 2004-NMSC-030, 24-34, 98 P.3d 699, 707-7 1 0.
81

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( 1 984). The ew Mexico courts have ruled similarly. See State
v. Crislip, 1 09 .M. 35 1 , 353, 785 P.2d 262, 264 (Ct. App. 1 989).

82 Crislip, 1 09 N.M. at 3 53, 785 P.2d at 264 .
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of the defendant's guilt.

83

Once again, New Mex ico uses the same test for establishing

ineffective assistance as is used by the Supreme Court.

C.

84

The Right to Confrontation : Out of Court Statements.

The S ixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the
ew Mexico Constitution both provide the accused with the right to confront and cross
examine their accusers. The Clause's ultimate goal is to "ensure reliability of evidence . . .
but. . . . [i]t commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."85 The U.S. Supreme
Court recently altered its Confrontation Clause j urisprudence with regard to out of court
statements. They held that out of court statements that are testimonial are barred from
use at trial unless the decl arant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine.

86

The New Mexico Supreme Court has refused to interpret the state

Confrontation Clause any more broadly than the federal with regard to out of court
statements. 87

III. ARGUING FOR EXPANSI ON BASED ON THE GUTIERREZ
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS NOTION
There are several strategies to argue for an expansion from federal precedent
under the New Mexico Constitution. First, however, it is absol utely essential that the

83

Id. at 354 265 ; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.

84

See id. ; State v. Franco, 2004 NMCA-099, ,r 14 1 36 N.M. 204, 96 P.3d 329, 334 ; State v. Richardson
1 14 N.M. 725, 727, 845 P.2d 8 1 9 82 1 (Ct. App. 1 992).

85
86

Crawford v. Washington, 1 24 S. Ct. 1 354, 1 3 69, 1 370 (2004).
Id. at 1 369.

81

State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC030, � 6, 98 P.3d 699, 703 (stating, without explanation, that they
would not interpret the state Confrontation Clause wider than its federal counterpart).
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accused properly preserve the state constitutional claim as provided in Gomez. As Gomez
requires, i f the court has not expanded on the right presently being asserted, the accused
must assert the right sought to be protected, establish a factual basis for the claim and
assert, in the trial court that the state constitutional provision should be interpreted more
expansively than its federal counterpart and provide reasons for interpreting the state
provision differently from the federal provision.

88

It is this final requirement-providing reasons for interpreting the state provision
more broadly than the federal-where parties likely fail to provide persuasive grounds for
departure. There are, however, many different approaches and strategies for doing so .
For instance, if the text differs in a significant way from its federal analog there may be
an argument for broader protections. 89 A unique history of the state constitution may also
provide fertile grounds for argument. This history can be found in historical records,
books, law reviews, newspaper articles, and other reliable sources.

90

Related case law

from sister states can be persuasive authority for expansion; however, over reliance on
sister states, especially where the decision is based on textual or historical di fferences
which are not present in New Mexico may undermine this approach. 91 Finally, Gomez
provides three reasons for departing from federal precedent under the interstitalism

88

See Part 1-B, supra .

89

One example is many state constitutions instead of using the standard privilege against self-incrimination
language, will provide that "no person is required to give evidence against himself." Thus, an argument
that this encompasses more than just statements or testimony may be successful .
90

See Jennifer Friesen, STATE C O STITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, Volume I, I .8(d) (3d. ed. 2000) {hereinafter Friesen Treatise).
91

Id.
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approach: a flawed federal analysis, structural di fferences between state and federal
government, or distinctive state characteristics.
While these strategies may have varying success, they can be profoundly more
fruitful when used through the vehicle of the fundamental rights notion. Gutierrez and its
search and seizure progeny provide the groundwork for a fundamental rights expansion
argument. The overriding premise of any argument for expansion shou ld be based on the
notion that the right sought to be protected is fundamental. The court's role in protecting
this right is not merely an instrumental approach, but a guardian of rights function. The
reason for expanding, therefore, is not a different history or text, or a flawed federal
analysis, but rather is because the right i s fundamental and the court has a duty to ensure
the protection and effectuation of that right. Discussions regarding sister states'
approaches or flawed analyses would only be used to show the court why the right is or is
not being protected or effectuated.
The Gutierrez court was able to establish its responsibi lity and duty to interpret
the New Mexico Constitution to ensure the fundamental rights it provides are protected
because it determined the Framers ' of the state constitution intended this to be the Court ' s
ro le. In Gutierrez, the court w as speaking t o the use of th e exclusionary ru l e as
constitutional ly required to effectuate the protection from unreasonable search and
sei zure but this can be expanded to other fundamental protections provided to the
accused .

A.

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

20

This privilege "reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble
aspirations."

92

It marks "an important advance in the development of our liberty-'one

93
of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civi lized. "' Indeed, "the
sovereign intrudes on a narrow autonomous sphere when it encourages sel f-harming self
accusation."94 At the core of the privilege is society' s "unwil lingness to subj ect those
suspected of crime to the cruel trilernma of sel f-accusation, perj ury or contempt."

95

In

other words, an accused forced to testify will have to choose between incriminating
himself and facing punishment, lying and facing a perjury prosecution, or refusing to
answer and facing contempt charges. 96

Miranda was premised on the notion that in custodial interrogations coercion and
police pressure may entice a defendant to incriminate himsel f. The Miranda warnings
were therefore necessary to prevent a defendant from involuntarily incriminating himself
and to remedy the inequities between police and the accused in a custodial interrogation
setting. However, interrogations that take place when an accused is not "in custody" can
have equal amounts of coercion and pressure. Further, any statements given to police
during non-custodial interrogation are admi ssible at trial to be used against the accused.

92

Murphy v. Waterfront Comm 'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 ( 1 964).

93

Ulmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 ( 1 956) (quoting Erwin N. Griswold The Fifth Amendment
Today 7 ( 1 955 )) .

94

George C. Thomas I J I , An Assault on the Temple ofMiranda, 85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 807, 8 14
( 1 995 ) .
95

7 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 452 ( Bowring ed. 1 843 ).

96

The privilege, however, does have its critics. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B . Lettow, Fifth
Amendment First Pn"nciples: The Self-lncrimi11ation Clause, 93 Mich L. Rev. 857 ( 1 995).
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No state bas yet to require Miranda warnings for non-custodial interrogations,

97

but it seems such interrogations, under some circumstances, would implicate the
fundamental precepts of the privilege against self-incrimination j ust as much as custodial
interrogations. If the appropriate factua1 circumstances arose, especially where a non
custodial interrogation was particularl y coercive, it may be appropriate to argue that the
state constitution requires a Miranda-type warning. It should not matter that the accused
is not lega11y in custody if the purposes behind the privilege are implicated. From a
fundamental rights perspective, the court has the duty to ensure the privilege can be
effectuated and in some non-custodial cases, this may require a Miranda warning.
One area where some states have departed from federal precedent is in
determining i f an accused has invoked bis right to have counsel present during
questioning.

98

Under federal law, if a suspect is equivocal or ambiguous about requesting

an attorney, police may continue questioning and the burden will fall on him to prove the
request was unequivocal. 99 Some states, on the other band, provide greater protection by
requiring the police to clarify, without coercion, as to whether a suspect is invoking his

Miranda right to counsel. 100 Delaware also requires the police to repeat the Miranda
warnings if a suspect has been ambiguous in invoking the Miranda rights. 1 0 1
Another area where states have departed is when an attorney is attempting to
reach a defendant who is in custody or is demanding that questioning cease until the
97

98

Friesen Treatise at § 1 2 .2(c).
Friesen Treatise at § 1 2 -2(c)(3)(i).

� Id

.

100

Id.

101

/d.
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attorney can speak with the defendant.

1 02

Typicall y under federal law, only the defendant

can invoke his rights, and thus any statement given wi ll be admissible, even though the
police knew his attorney was attempting to reach him . Oregon, conversely, has
suppressed statements taken after an accused's attorney attempted to reach him or was
demanding to see the accused.

1 03

With regard to coerced confessions, some states have been willing to depart from
federal precedent. Hawai i has held, for instance, that such confessions, whether taken by
police or non-police actors will be suppressed. 1 04 Under federal law, only confessions
coerced by police or prosecutors wi l l be suppressed.

1 05

The Hawaii court reasoned that

the purpose of excluding involuntary confessions is due to their unreliability.

1 06

Thus,

the confession will be just as unreliable and therefore excludable from use at trial,
regardless of who extracts it. This is similar to a fundamental rights notion in that
regardless of who took the confession, the only way to effectuate the right to be free from
forced self-incrimination is to exclude the evidence from court.
Finally, under federal law, even i f a confession is found to be coerced on appeal,
the reviewing court wi ll conduct a harmless error analysis to determine whether the
conviction should be reversed. 1 07 Although there have not been departures from this

102

Id.

1 03

See State v. Simonson 878 P.2d 409 (Ore. 1 994 ) ; State v. Haynes, 602 P.2d 272 (Ore. 1 979 ).

104

State v. Bowe, 88 1 P.2d 538 (Haw. 1 994 ) .

1 05

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 1 57 ( 1 986).

106 Bowe, 88 1 P .2d 538.
107

See Part T I-A, supra.
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1
standard, 08 the hannless error review seems contrary to protecting fundamental rights.
1n Gutierrez, the court stated the only way to effectuate the ri ght in the case was to
exclude the evidence; thereb y, placing the party in the position he was in before his rights
were violated. To affect the same result for coerced confessions, the court should require
reversal anytime a confession is found to be coerced, especi ally in light of the impact a
confession may have on the j ury. 109

B.

The Right to Counsel: Effective Assistance

A fundamental tenet to our system ofjustice is that counsel for a defendant in a
criminal case is a necessity, not a luxury. 1 10 Absent a lawyer, the accused "faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish hi s innocence." 1

11

Indeed most agree, "the very legitimacy of the American criminal justice system depends
in considerable part on the participation of competent, ethical defense lawyers who
diligently represent their clients' best interests." 1 1 2 Furthermore, i f the right to counsel is
to be effectuated "defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel."

1 13

Thus, defendants are not only entitled to be represented by counsel� but to have effective
assistance of counsel. 1 1 4

1 08
1 09

Friesen Treati e at § 1 2-2 (c )( I ) .

See note 79, supra.

1 10

Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S . 335 , 344 ( 1 963) .

111

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 69 ( 1 932 ) .

1 12

Joshua Dressler, UNDERSTANDING CRJMINAL PROCEDURE, 595 ( 3d ed 2002 ).

1 13

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 77 1 ( 1 970) .

1 14

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 685 .
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Nevertheless, the standard, for p roving ineffective assistance of counsel is
extremely difficult for a defendant to meet.

1 15

Not onl y must the defendant p rove his

attorne y 's conduct fell below p revailing professional standards, but he must also show
that the mistake chan ged the outcome of the trial.

1 16

Only California, Hawaii , and Maine

have used a less stringent standard under their state constitutions. 1 1 7 In Hawaii , a
defendant need onl y show ( 1 ) there were specific errors reflecting counsel's lack of skill,
j udgment , or diligence, and ( 2 ) such errors resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial
impairment of potentiall y meritorious defenses.

1 18

Hawaii departs from the stricter federal standard because it is "undul y di fficult for
defendants to meet . . . [ and ] Hawaii's Constitution. . . afford [ s] greater protection of their
ri ght to effective assistance of counsel."

1 19

This is precisely bow a fundamental rights

approach should operate. In this instance , the federal anal ysis is flawed because it i s too
stringent and does not allow the fundamental ri ght of effective assistance of counsel to be
effectuated. Therefore, the standard i s lessened to a de gree the court feels appropriate to
effect uate the right. Utilizing Gutierrez, this approach could be adopted in New Mexico.

C.

1 15

The Right to Confrontation : Out of Court Statements

See Part ll-B, supra.

1 16

id.

1 17

Friesen Treatise at § 1 2- 1 0( a) .

1 18

State v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1 298 , 1 305 ( Haw. 1 992).

1 19

Id. at 1 305 n. 2. California and Maine depart on similar grounds us i ng similar tests for proving
ineffective assistance. See /11 re Felipe Evangelista Sixto, 48 Cal.3d 1 247 ( 1 989); Lang v. Murch, 438 A.2d
9 1 4 (Maine 1 98 1 ).

25

No state has dep arted from the new Confrontation Clause test for out o f court
statements created in Crawford.

1 20

Nonetheless, a prime example of how the

fundamental ri ghts approach can be used to ex pand state constitutional ri gh ts arises from
that case. The U.S. Supreme Court found that onl y testimonial out-of-court statements
would be subj ect to the requirements of unavai lability of the declarant and a prior
o pportuni ty to cross. 1 2 1 This begs the question of what statements wiU be considered
testimonial. In Crawford, Justice Scali a, who authored the m aj ority op inion, refused to
establish a test, but stated that statements to the police in custodial interro gation and
grand j ury testimony would certainl y q ualify . 122
One commonl y used out of court statement was not mentioned. This is the
questionable use of a co-defendant's statement, put into evidence b y a third p arty who
heard the statement. These statements are often used when the co-defendant refuses to
cooperate against the defendant and is made unavailable to testi fy by asserting the Fifth
Amendment p rivilege. The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, has suggested in
dicta that such a statement would not be testimonial, esp eciall y where the third p arty is a
friend, fami l y member or acq uaintance of the co-defendant and is told the statement in
casual conversation.

1 23

If thi s issue were sq uarel y before the court, it may be p ersuaded to depart from

Crawford and app l y the rule to some or all non-testimoni al statements based on a
fundamental ri ghts approach to New Mexico 's Confrontation Clause. For instance,
1 20

See Section ll-C, supra.

12 1

Crawford, 1 24 S. Ct. at 1 369.

1 22

Id. at 1 372.

1 23

A lvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, 23.
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imagine a case where a co-defendant tells a friend the defendant told the co-defendant to
ki ll a person and the defendant would pay the co-defendant. Subsequently, that friend
testi fied about this statement at trial and the co-defendant refuses to testi fy exercising his
1
ri ght to remain silent. 24 The whole purpose of the Confrontation Clause, by its language,
is to allow a defendant to confront his accusers and ensure the evidence they offer is
reliable by use of cross-examination. However, under federal precedent, merely because
the out of court statement is not testimonial, the Confrontation Clause is not violated . On
the other hand, a fundamental rights approach would hold that the only way to effectuate
the right of confrontation in that case would be either to allow cross-examination or
suppress the statement. Testimonial or not, the court 's are required to protect the
defendant's fundamental right to face his accuser' s, and confront and cross-examine
them.

CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court has been more than wi lling to expand search
and seizure protection to its citizens under the state constitution. At first, it appeared the
court was using a fundamental ri ghts justification to depart from federal precedent. More
recently, however, the court appears to depart from federal search and seizure
jurisprudence solely because they have done so in the past. 1 25 This perhaps explains why
the court has not departed in other areas of criminal procedure. And it gives advocates
very little to explain why the court should depart from federal precedent as required to
preserve a claim under Gomez.

1 24

See State v. Go11zales, 1 999-NMSC-033, 1 28 N.M. 44, 989 P.2d 4 1 9.

1 25

See Josh Ewing, Primacy: An Additional Layer of Protection for New Mexico 's Criminally Accused?
(2004).
27

The court needs to be refocused on its fundamental rights approach it enunciated
in Gutierrez, in the area of search and seizure as well as other fundamental protections for
the criminally accused. This approach provides a reasoned and sound basis for departing
from federal precedent and avoids the pitfal ls of presuming federal law is correct unless a
specifically delineated reason is provided. It wi l l also create an independent rights
jurisprudence for New Mex ico, thereby upholding the courts ' duty to interpret its own
state constitution as it deems appropriate.
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